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## TO THE PRINCE REGENT:

ON THE DISPUTE WITH THE AMERICAN STATES.

SIR,

Feeling, as the people of this kingdom do so severely, smarting, writhing, as we are, under the effects of the war with France, and considering how easily this war might, in 1793, have been avoided without either danger or dishonour to England; thus feeling and thus reflecting, it is natural for us, when threatened with a new war, to inquire betimes, what are the grounds of such war; whether it would be just; if just, whether it would be necessary; and, be the cause what it may, whether the consequences are likely to be good or evil.

If, Sir, the counsels of Mr. Fox had been listened to, in the years 1792 and 1793, the state of England, of Europe, and of the world, would have been very different indeed from what it now is. A war against opinions and principles would not have been waged; England, instead of becoming a party in that fatal and disgraceful war, would have been a mediatrix between the conflicting parties, if, indeed, she had not wholly prevented the conflict. So many governments would not have been overthrown; such rivers of human blood would not have been shed; reformation might and would have been produced, because the state of things and the temper of men's minds demanded it; but no where need there have been destruction; all the states of Europe might have remained on their old foundations, and the Bourbons might at this day have been upon the Thrones of France and Spain. This kingdom, too, might and must have shared in the reformation; but, such reformation would have made no inroads upon rank or property; and the nation would have avoided all those measures of coercion, all those before unheard-of laws to which the contest gave rise; and those enormous expences, which, first producing Debt and tenfold Taxation, led by degrees to that *pauperism* and *paper-money*, which now form the two great and hideous features in the state of

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our internal affairs, and which no man, who really loves the country, can contemplate without the most serious apprehensions.

Such being the consequences of that war, or, rather, a part of these consequences, the far greater proportion of them being, in all probability, yet to come, it behoves those who have power to act to *consider well*, before they launch the country into a new war; and it is the right of every man to express, in the way which he may think most likely to be efficient, his opinions upon the subject. This right I am now about to exercise, and if I have chosen, as the vehicle, an address to your Royal Highness, it is because that respect, which inclination as well as duty dictate upon such an occasion, will not fail to make me dismiss from my mind all partiality and prejudice, and to offer nothing unsupported by fair reasoning and undeniable facts.

As to the grounds of the present dispute with the American States, they are some of them of very long standing. The conduct of this government relative to the war against those States was extremely unwise; but, its conduct since the war is, I am convinced, unparalleled in the annals of diplomatic folly. The moment that war was at an end, the people of the two countries, attached to each other by all the ties which imperious nature has provided, were ready to rush into a mutual embrace, and like children of the same common parent, whose harmony had been disturbed by a transient quarrel, to become even more affectionate towards each other than they had been before. Not so the governments. With them ambition and resentment had something to say. But, the American Government being, from the nature of its constitution, a thing of such transient possession, it would have been impossible for any set of men long to remain in power if they had been discovered to entertain a vindictive disposition towards England; that is to say, if the government of England had discovered no such disposition towards Ame-

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rica. Unhappily such a disposition was but too plainly seen in the whole of the conduct of our government; and hence we have witnessed, from the end of the American war to this day, a dispute and an angry dispute too, upon some ground or other, constantly existing and in agitation between the two countries, to the great injury of them both, to the great injury of the cause of freedom, and to the great advantage of France as a nation, and to the cause of despotic sway all over the world. The war was at an end, but the quarrel seemed only to have begun: a seven years war, and an already eight and twenty years of quarrel!

It was full ten years before we condescended to send a Minister to reside in America, and when we did it, the object seemed to be only to recall, or to render more active, ancient animosities. A miserable dispute about old claims for debts due to English subjects on one side, and about negroes carried off at the peace on the other side, clouded and made gloomy the dawn of this new diplomatic intercourse. This dispute was kept alive 'till new claims for vessels unlawfully confiscated arose on the part of the American Government. The treaty of 1794, which provided for Commissioners to settle these claims would, it was hoped, produce harmony; but it is well known that it only widened the breach. At last, however, we patched up this matter: we yielded, but it was without magnanimity: we gave our money, the nation was taxed to make up for the blunders of the cabinet; but we gave without the credit of generosity. In the meanwhile, the English creditors have remained, many of them until this day, unsatisfied, while a Board of Commissioners, who have been sitting either here or in America ever since the year 1794, or, at least, have been paid all that time, have swallowed up in expences to the nation, a great part of what would have sufficed to satisfy our own claimants without any application for money for that purpose to the American States. In the course of this part of the dispute there was much unfairness on the part of the American Government; and we might have been fully justified, strictly speaking, in coming to a rupture upon that ground. But, we came to neither a rupture nor a reconciliation: we asserted our claims and then gave them up; but we took care to choose that manner of doing

it, which effectually took all merit from the thing.

This point was hardly patched up, when another subject of dispute arose: to that another and another and another have succeeded, the long-contested question relative to the impressment of American Seamen running through the whole. So that, at last, there has grown together a mass of disputes and of ill-blood, which threatens us with a new war, and which war threaten us with new burdens, and, still worse, which threaten the world with the extinguishment of some part, at least, of its remaining liberties. The points, however, more immediately at issue, are those relating to the present *non-importation law* and the *affair between the American Frigate, President, and our sloop of war, the Little Belt*. As to the former points in dispute the Americans were the complainants: they called for satisfaction, and, whether they ought to have obtained it or not, it is certain that they have not yet obtained it. Upon these two recent points, therefore, as being thought likely to lead to war, and as being so represented by those public prints which are known to be under the influence of persons in power, I shall now proceed most respectfully to offer to your Royal Highness such remarks as the occasion appears to me to demand.

The *Non-importation Act*, that is to say, the law which has been passed in America to prohibit the importation of any thing being the growth or manufacture of Great Britain or Ireland, and which law is now in force in America, must doubtless be regarded as a measure of a hostile, though not of a warlike nature, because the same law does not apply to the enemy with whom we are at war; and, besides this commercial prohibition, our ships of war are shut out from the harbours, rivers, and waters of the United States, while our enemy's ships of war are permitted freely to enter and abide in them. These are distinctions of an unfriendly nature: they are, indeed, measures of hostility; but, then, I beg your Royal Highness to bear in mind, that they are acts of a much lower degree of hostility than were the acts of your Royal Father's ministers against France in the year 1792, though they, to this hour, contend, that that war was a war of aggression on the part of France; and, of course, their own doctrine, if now cited against this country, would be quite



sufficient on the part of America. But, the fact is, that the non-importation act and the exclusion of British ships from the waters of America, while importation is permitted from France and while French ships have free entrance and abidance in the waters of the United States, are acts of a hostile nature, and would, if unjustified by provocation, fully authorize, on our part, acts of reprisal and of war.

But, Sir, these measures on the part of America have not been adopted without alleged provocation and without loud and reiterated remonstrances. They have, in fact, arisen out of certain measures adopted by us, and which measures are alleged to be in violation of the rights of America as a neutral nation; and, therefore, before we can justify a war in consequence of the hostile measures of America, we must ascertain whether her allegations against us be true; for, if they be, we may find, perhaps, that she is not only not blamable for what she has now done, but is entitled to praise for her forbearance and moderation.

That we have violated the rights of America as a neutral State, there can be no doubt. The fact is not denied; nor is it pretended, that the violation would not, in itself, be sufficient to justify any degree of hostility on the part of the offended state. Indeed, to dispute these facts would be to shew a total disregard of truth; for, we have published, and, as far as in us lies, we have carried, and still carry into execution, *an interdict against all trade on the part of America, except such as we choose to licence*. We have said to her, that she shall not carry the produce of her soil and exchange it for the produce of the soil of France, Italy, or Holland. If we meet with one of her ships laden with the flour of Pennsylvania and owned by a Pennsylvanian merchant, bound to any port of the French Empire, we compel such ship to come into some one of our ports, and there to unlade and dispose of her cargo, or else, to *pay duty upon it*, before we permit her to proceed on her voyage. In short, we have issued and acted upon such edicts as establish an absolute controul and sovereignty over the ships of America, and all that part of the population and property of America that are employed in maritime commerce.

That the rights of America are herein

openly violated all the world knows. Your Royal Highness need not be reminded of the dispute, so long continued, relative to the *right of search*; that is to say, a right, on the part of a belligerent to search merchant neutral ships at sea, in order to ascertain whether they had on board *contraband goods of war*, or *goods belonging to an enemy*. It was contended by those who denied the right of search, that no belligerent had a right to search a neutral at sea in any case; and, that, if this point was given up, the *goods* of an enemy in a neutral ship ought not to be seized, for that the neutrality of the ship protected the goods. To this doctrine English writers and statesmen have never subscribed; they insisted, that we had a right to search neutral ships upon the high seas, and, if we found contraband articles or enemy's goods on board of them, to seize them, and, in some cases, to make ship as well as cargo lawful prize. But, no statesman, no lawyer, no writer ever pretended, that we had a right to seize in a *neutral ship* the *goods of a neutral party*. No one ever dreamt of setting up a right like this, which, in fact, is neither more nor less than making war upon the neutrals; because we do to them the very worst that we can do, short of wanton cruelty, of which the laws and usages of war do not allow.

In justification of the adoption of these our measures towards America, our government asserted, that France had *begun* the violation of the neutral rights of America, and that our measures were in the way of *retaliation*, and that the laws of war allowed of retaliation. It is a singular species of *law*, which, because a weak nation has been injured by one powerful nation, subjects it to be injured by another. If Belcher were to beat Mr. Perceval and Lord Liverpool in the street, Crib would not, for that reason, be justified in beating them too: this would, I presume, be deemed a new and most outrageous species of retaliation; and there is little doubt that the belligerent pugilists would soon be sent to a place where they would have leisure to study the laws of war. But, it is alleged by our government, that the Americans *submitted* to the Decrees of Napoleon; that they *acquiesced* in his violation of their rights; and that it was just in us to treat them in the same manner that he had treated them, because they had so submitted and acquiesced. The same rea-

son would apply equally well in justification of the above supposed retaliatory measures of Crib, who also might, with just as much truth, accuse Mr. Perceval and Lord Liverpool of submission and acquiescence with regard to Belcher; for they could not avoid submission and acquiescence to superior force; they might *cry out*, indeed, and, they would cry out; and so did the Americans, who, from the first day to the last of the existence of the French Decrees, ceased not to remonstrate against them, and that, too, in the strongest terms; and, therefore, there appears not to have been the slightest ground, whereon to build a justification of our measures as measures of *retaliation*.

But, Sir, if our measures were not justifiable upon the supposition that this violation of neutral rights was *begun* by the enemy, surely they must be declared to be wholly without justification, if it appear, that *we ourselves were the beginners* in this career of violation of the rights of America as a neutral state; and that this is the fact is clearly proved by the documents, which have long ago been laid before the public, but which I beg leave to call to the recollection of your Royal Highness.

This rivalry in the violation of neutral rights began in a declaration on our part, made to America through her Minister here, that she was to consider the entrances of the Ems, the Weser, the Elbe and the Trave as in a state of rigorous blockade, though it was notoriously impossible for us to maintain such blockade by actual forces. The grounds for this measure were stated to be, that *the King of Prussia* (and not France) had forcibly and hostilely taken possession of various parts of *the Electorate of Hanover* and other dominions belonging to his Majesty, and had shut English ships out of the Prussian ports. This might be a very good reason for shutting the Ems, the Weser, the Elbe and the Trave against *Prussian* ships; but, surely it gave us no right to shut them against the ships of America, whose government had had nothing to do with the king of Prussia's hostile seizure upon the Electorate of Hanover; who had neither aided him, abetted him, nor encouraged him in any manner whatever; and, it was very hard that the people of America should be made to suffer from the result of a dispute, be it what it might, between the

king of Prussia and the Elector of Hanover. The king of Prussia is closely connected by marriage with your Royal Highness's illustrious family: it is not therefore for me to dare to presume that he should have been capable of any thing unbecoming his high rank; but this I may venture to say, that, whatever his conduct might be, there could be no justice in making the people, or any portion of the people, of America suffer for that conduct. Indeed, Sir, it appears to me, that to involve, in any way whatever, England in this dispute about Hanover was not very closely conformable to that great constitutional Act by which your Royal Highness's family was raised to the throne of this kingdom, and which Act expressly declares, that, in case of the family of Brunswick succeeding to the Throne, no war shall be undertaken by England for their German dominions, *unless by consent of Parliament*. If the measure of blockade above-mentioned had produced war on the part of America, that war would have been made without consent of Parliament; and, though a measure fall short of producing war, it may be equally a violation of the Act of Settlement, if its natural tendency be to produce war, or to cause England to support warlike expences, which this measure manifestly has done, and has, at last, led to something very nearly approaching to open war with America, though, in the mean while, Hanover itself has been wrested from the king of Prussia and formed into a member of another kingdom.

Thus, then, at any rate, this attack upon the rights of neutrals did not *begin* with France. If it was not begun by us, it was begun by the king of Prussia, though it is not very easy to perceive how he could violate the maritime rights of America by any act of his in the heart of Germany. The Decrees of France have grown out of our measures. They carry in themselves the proof of this. The first (for there are but two), issued from Berlin, was expressly grounded upon our Orders issued in consequence of the conduct of the king of Prussia in Hanover; and thus the Emperor Napoleon became, towards us, the avenger, as far as he was able, of that very king of Prussia, whom he had just driven from his dominions! Alas, Sir, what a scene was here exhibited to the people of Europe! First the king of Prussia, closely related to the family of the king of

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England, seizes upon the German dominions of the latter: the latter protests against this, and, by his Secretary of State, declares that he never will make peace without obtaining the restoration of these dominions: while this quarrel is going on, Napoleon marches against the king of Prussia, defeats him, drives him from his dominions, takes Hanover, the object in dispute, and bestows it on a third party; and, from the capital of the king of Prussia's dominions, issues a decree against England, avenging the cause of the king of Prussia!

Napoleon, in this his first decree, declares *England* (who had, by this time, extended her blockade from the Elbe to the Port of Brest) *in a state of Blockade*, and prohibits all trade and all commercial communication with England. But, this Decree, which was little less practicable in all cases than our blockade, was declared to be *retaliatory*, and was to be repealed whenever England repealed her Orders in Council which had then been issued. Certainly this was not the *beginning*. We had begun, and that, too, under the administration of those who have since so loudly censured the Orders in Council; and, which must, I presume, be a subject of regret with your Royal Highness, the state paper in which this beginning was announced to the American government, came from the pen of Mr. Fox, who appears to have yielded implicitly to the principles of his new associates in politics. At any rate, this Decree of the Emperor Napoleon was not the beginning of the open attacks upon neutral rights; and, what is of still more importance, it was *not Napoleon*, but it was *the king of Prussia*, who committed those acts of aggression in Hanover which produced our first of that series of measures, called the Orders in Council, and which measures have finally led to the exclusion of our goods and our ships from the American ports. This is a fact of great importance in the dispute, and especially if that dispute should end in war. It will be right, in that case, for us to bear in mind the *real grounds of the war*; the *true origin of it*. And, endeavour to cast the blame where we will, it will, at last, be found in the *aggression of the king of Prussia upon Hanover*.

The Berlin Decree brought forth new

Orders in Council from us; and these brought from the Emperor Napoleon the Decree issued at Milan, in December 1807. This ended the series of invasions of neutral rights; for, indeed, nothing more was now left to invade. Both parties called their measures *retaliatory*. Crib having taken a blow upon a third party in the way of retaliation on Belcher, Belcher takes another blow upon the same party in the way of retaliation on Crib. Both parties declared, that they were perfectly ready to *repeal* their Decrees; that they *regretted* exceedingly the necessity of adopting them; each explicitly promised, that, whenever the other gave up the new restrictions he would also give them up too. Napoleon said his measures had been forced upon him by us: we said our measures had been forced upon us by him. The Americans, who complained of both, were told by us, that we should always be ready to revoke our Orders if the enemy would revoke his Decrees. This was saying very little, seeing that his Decrees had been issued *in consequence of our Orders*, and, of course, he was not to be expected to revoke first, especially as the Decrees themselves declare that their object is to cause our Orders to be revoked.

The American government, having remonstrated so long in vain, and seeing no likelihood of obtaining redress by the means of diplomatic entreaties, and yet not wishing to plunge the country into a war, resort to the measure of *exclusion from their ports*, giving to both parties an opportunity of preventing the execution even of this measure of demi-hostility. During the session of Congress in 1809-10, a law was passed providing, that, if both France and England continued in their violation of the rights of America till and after the 1st day of November, 1810, the ships and goods of both should be prohibited from entering the ports and waters of the American States; that, if they both repealed their obnoxious Decrees and Orders, then the ships and goods of both were to have free admission; that if one party repealed and the other did not, then the ships and goods of the repealing party were to be admitted, and the ships and goods of the non-repealing party were to be excluded. Napoleon, the Americans say, has repealed: we have not, and, accordingly, our ships and goods are excluded, while those of France are admitted into the waters and ports of the United States.

This is one source of the present ill-blood against America, who is accused of *partiality to France*; but, before this charge can be established, we must show that the measures she has adopted are not the natural and necessary result of an impartial measure; a measure in execution of an impartial law. If a pardon were tendered to Belcher and Crib upon condition that they ceased to beat the parties as above supposed, and if Belcher persisted while his enemy did not, the injured parties could not fairly be accused of *partiality* in pardoning Crib while they punished Belcher. The American Government and people may, however, without any crime, or, at least, without giving us any just cause of complaint against them, like, and shew that they like, Napoleon better than Messrs. Perceval and Rose and Lords Liverpool and Wellesley. It may be bad taste in the American Government and people to entertain such a liking; it may be great stupidity and almost wilful blindness that prevent them from perceiving how much more the latter are the friends of freedom than the former. But, so long as the American Government does no act of partiality affecting us, we have no reason to complain: so that justice is done to a man in court, he has no reason to complain of the personal likings or dislikings of the judge or the jury. The people in America look at France and at the state of Europe in general with minds pretty free from prejudice. They are in no fear of the power of Napoleon. They have amongst them no persons whose interests are served by inflaming the hatred of the people against him. They reckon dynasties as nothing. They coolly compare the present with the former state of Europe; and, if they give the preference to the present state of things, it must be because they think there has been a change for the better. They may be deceived; but, it can be the interest of nobody to deceive them. Those who have the management of their public affairs may have a wrong bias; but they cannot communicate it to the people; for, they have no public money to expend upon a hireling press. The government and the people may all be deceived; but the deception cannot be the effect of any cheat practised upon either; it cannot be the work of bribery and corruption. If, therefore, the government and people of America do really entertain a partiality for Napoleon, we have, on that account, good ground for regret, but certainly none

for complaint or reproach. They have a right to like and to dislike whom they please. We, for instance, have a great attachment to the court and government of Sicily and also to the courts and ancient governments of Spain and Portugal. We should not permit the American government or people to interfere with these attachments of ours; and, I presume, it will, therefore, not be thought reasonable that we should arrogate to ourselves the right of judging whom the American people and government are to like.

When we are told of the "*partiality for France*," which is a charge continually preferred against the American government, we should ask what *acts* of partiality they have been guilty of, and that is the test by which we ought to try their conduct in the present instance. They have put their law in force; they have shut out our goods and our ships, while they freely admit those of France; and this is called *partiality*, and is made the grounds of one of these charges, by the means of which, it appears to me, that the venal press in England is endeavouring to prepare the minds of the people for a war with the American States. But, to make out this charge, it must be shown, that the French have done nothing that we have not done in the way of repealing the injurious Decrees. Indeed, this is what is asserted; and, though a regular communication has been made to the American government by the French government, that the Berlin and Milan Decrees *are revoked*; though they are by the American Minister here asserted to be revoked, and no longer in operation; still it is asserted by some here, that they are not revoked. The American government, however, is satisfied that they are revoked, and it has, accordingly, put its exclusion law in force against us.

To settle this point of fact the Americans have not been told what sort of *evidence* we shall require. They present us the letter of the French minister for foreign affairs to the American minister at Paris, telling him, that the Decrees *are revoked*, and that the revocation is *to go into effect* on the 1st of November 1810. This we say is nothing at all, because it is clogged with this remark, "*it being clearly understood that the English Orders in Council are to be revoked at the same time.*" Certainly. This was to be naturally expected;



and England had promised that it should be so. The Decrees *have* actually been revoked, without this condition being complied with on our part; but, if they had not, it was to be expected that the American Government would put their exclusion law in force against us at the time appointed; because we ought to have declared our *intention* at the same time and in the same manner that the French declared their intention. It was in the month of August 1810, that Mr. Pinckney, the American minister in London, communicated to our Foreign Secretary, Lord Wellesley, that the French Decrees were revoked, and that the revocation was to take effect from the 1st day of the then ensuing November. The answer which Mr. Pinckney expected was, that the English Orders in Council were also revoked, and that the revocation would take effect from the 1st of November. That he had a right to expect this will clearly appear from the communications made to the American Government by our ministers in that country, who, in answer to the complaints of America upon this score, always declared, that the King their master was exceedingly grieved to be compelled to have recourse to such measures; that nothing could be farther from his heart or more repugnant to his feelings than a wish to injure or harrass the commerce of neutrals; that he had taken these odious measures in pure self-defence; that it was his "*earnest desire*" (I quote one of these declarations) "to see the commerce of the world restored to that *freedom*, which is necessary for its prosperity, and his *readiness* to abandon the system, which had been forced upon him, whenever the enemy should retract the principles which had rendered it necessary." When, therefore, Mr. Pinckney, who had this declaration before him, communicated to Lord Wellesley the fact that the French Decrees were revoked, and that the revocation was to go into effect on the 1st of November, he had a full right to expect an immediate revocation of our Orders in Council, and an assurance that such revocation should go into effect on the same day when the French revocation was to go into effect. But, instead of this he received for answer, that we would revoke our Orders, when the revocation of the French Decrees should have *actually taken place*. But there was another condition, "that whenever the repeal of the French Decrees shall

"have *actually taken place*, and the commerce of neutral nations shall have been restored to the condition in which it stood previously to the promulgation of these Decrees," then the King will relinquish his present system. Here is a *second* condition. We do not here content ourselves with the revocation of the Decrees; no, nor even with that revocation having actually gone into effect. We call for something more, and that something greater too than the thing for which we before contended. We here say, that, before we revoke our Orders, we will have the neutral commerce restored to its old footing; that is, that we will have the "Continental System" abandoned by France, with which system the Americans have nothing to do, and with regard to which they can have no right to say a word, it being a series of measures of internal regulation, not trenching upon nor touching their maritime commerce. It is a matter wholly distinct from the other; it relates to the reception or exclusion of English goods in France and her dependencies; and, if we are to make America answerable for the conduct of France in that respect, it would follow that France would have a right to make her answerable for our conduct in excluding the goods of France from the ports of England.

We had, it appears to me, no right to require any thing of America, previously to our revocation of the obnoxious Orders, than an official and authenticated declaration, that the French Decrees were revoked. And, what more could we ask for than was tendered to us, I am at a loss to conjecture. The French Government officially informed the American Government that the Decrees were revoked, and that the revocation was to have effect on the 1st of November. This was officially communicated to us by the American Government through their accredited minister. We were, therefore, to give credit to the fact. But, no: we stop to see the 1st of November arrive. This was not the way to convince America of our *readiness*, our *earnest desire*, to see neutral commerce restored to freedom. The course to pursue, in order to give proof of such a disposition, was to revoke our Orders in Council, and to declare that the revocation would begin to be acted upon on the 1st of November. This would have been *keeping pace* with the French; and, if we had found that the revocation did not

go into operation in France on the 1st of November, we should have lost nothing by our revocation; for we might immediately have renewed our Orders in Council, and we should then have continued them in force, having clearly thrown all the blame upon the enemy.

This line of conduct would, too, have been perfectly consonant with our professions to the American Government, to whom, in 1808, our minister had declared, that, in order to evince the security of our desire to remove the impediments to neutral commerce, we were willing to follow the example of France in the way of revocation, or, to proceed step for step with her in the way of relaxation. Our minister, upon the occasion here alluded to, in communicating the several Orders in Council to the American Government, declared that "the king felt great regret at the necessity imposed upon him for such an interference with neutral commerce, and he assured the American Government, that his Majesty would readily follow the example, in case the Berlin Decree should be rescinded; or, would proceed, *pari passu* with France, in relaxing the rigour of their measures." Agreeably to this declaration, we should, it clearly appears to me, have done exactly what France did in August 1810, and not evaded it by saying that we would revoke after her revocation should have been actually put into operation; that is to say, that we would condescend to begin after France had ended.

This is the view, may it please your Royal Highness, which clear and unclouded reason takes of this matter. This is the light in which it has been seen by the American government and by the people of that country, who, though they do not wish for war, will assuredly not censure those who manage their affairs for acting as they have done upon this occasion. The measure of exclusion adopted against us by America is too advantageous to France for the latter not to act upon the revocation of her Decrees; and, indeed, there appears now not to be the smallest doubt, that, as far as relates to America, (and she is in reality the only neutral), the Decrees are, in deed as well as in word, revoked. It is notorious that our Orders are not revoked; and, for my part, I am wholly at a loss to form an idea of the grounds upon which any complaint against

America can be founded, as far as relates to this part of the dispute.

In a future Letter, I shall submit to your Royal Highness some remarks relating to the affair of the *Little Belt*, and shall endeavour to lay before you the real state of that case, and the consequences which would naturally arise from a rupture with America, or from a prolongation of the present quarrel.

I am, &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate,  
Thursday, 29th August, 1811.

### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

TALAVERA'S WARS.—The inactivity of the present campaign in Spain and Portugal is truly astonishing. I thought we were told, that, long before the month of September, the Peninsula would be scoured of the French as clean as our purse promises to be by supporting the war. Mr. Perceval went so far as to anticipate consequences of great import in other parts of Europe. It was not for him, he said, to say what effect our victories might produce upon the people of France themselves; but, he did not think it at all unreasonable to entertain the hope, that we might, in pursuing those victories, become, under Divine Providence, the deliverers of Europe. Verily Viscount Talavera does not appear to be making any very hasty strides towards such deliverance. He has, it appears, moved again of late; but, to what point or for what purpose we are as yet uninformed, his dispatches, or that part of them that we are permitted to see, being as brief and as dry as the endorsement of an Attorney's bill. The French armies that were approaching him, at whose approach he raised the siege of Badajoz after his attempts to enter the breach, and before whom he retired to Elvas and Portalegre; those armies are, our venal writers tell us, dispersed; Talavera, they say, has beat them again. Why, then, does he not resume the siege of Badajoz, which those armies made him abandon? That would be a proof of the French armies being unable to face him; but, all that I can see in his present conduct is a proof of his consciousness of an inability to meet the French in the field. This, perhaps, is no fault of his: he is not to be blamed for wanting either numbers or species of troops fit to meet the





enemy: but those are greatly to blame, who represent him as being able to meet the enemy, and, at the same time, praise him for *not meeting* that enemy.—But, if what the public prints now state be true, we are about to see a new sort of exertions made in the Peninsula. We are, it seems, to *take a more commanding tone*, and, with *whom*, do you suppose? Why, with our *allies*! With our allies to be sure, with whom should we take a commanding tone? As to the enemy, he does not care a straw for our resolute *tone*. In the field he sends his Polish Lancers to answer us; and in his news-papers he challenges us to pay our Bank Notes in gold and silver. But, let us hear this curious scheme for taking a more commanding tone with our *allies*, poor fellows!—"It is *not true* that Lord Viscount Wellington is on his return to England in consequence of *indisposition*. On the contrary, we have reason to believe, from the information we have received, that he is destined to fill a more important situation, and discharge more extensive duties in the Peninsula than ever. There is a rumour that our Cabinet has at length determined to *take a more commanding and decisive tone with our Allies* than they have hitherto done, and without which they perceive, that the war may be protracted from year to year without the least advancement under the *languor, disinclination, or treachery, of the leading Councils of the two Kingdoms*.—To meet the enemy with adequate energy, it is incumbent on our allies really to draw forth all their resources, and to act with one mind. To do this they must agree to invest Lord Wellington with proper authority to *arouse and exert the faculties of the people, who are all well disposed, and desire only to have their own grievances redressed, the hope of a benignant Government established, and leaders whom they can trust*.—We have heard that remonstrances on this subject have been at length attended with success, in Portugal; and that Lord Wellington will no longer have to complain of the *dilatory and evasive* conduct of the Government, for the power to call forth the energies of the people will be *put into his own hands*. As trustee for the Prince Regent, surely England, that fights *his battles*, may be trusted with the means of making these battles successful; and we have no hesitation in saying, that if any thing can give us a chance of terminat-

ing the war in the Peninsula with advantage to the people themselves, it is by placing a generous confidence in the hands of the power that has come to *their assistance*.—We trust the same language will be spoken to the Government and the *Cortez of Spain*, as well as to the *Court of Sicily*; for we most perfectly agree with the opinion of Captain Pasley, that if we are to *fight the battles of our allies*, we ought to be intrusted with the means of drawing forth all the *resources of the countries* we defend.—A temporary Regency to be established in every country where British Armies are to fight for the deliverance thereof, is the only means of effecting that unanimity of exertions which is necessary to success; and when it is seen what frivolous divisions prevail among the leaders, and what *oppressions* keep down and stifle all ardour in the people, it is manifest that unless our Government is as imbecile and as besotted as those of Palermo and of Cadiz themselves, we must arouse from our own *squamous inaction*, and exert a clear, an honourable, but a *commanding influence in the Governments which we assist*."

—This is from the Morning Chronicle; but the hint about the *indisposition* of Lord Talavera was first thrown out in the *Times*, a print, which is, for very sufficient reasons no doubt, become totally devoted to the Wellesleys. This was an ugly hint; and it has not been contradicted. It resembled one of those numerous little paragraphs that are published in the course of the year for the purpose of *feeling the public pulse*. But, no, my reader, we shall not, we surely shall not, see a Wellesley come home under such circumstances! Oh, no! The *Times* must have wronged him in the hint. It was a false rumour to be sure. What! *taken ill* under such circumstances! It is a standing order in most armies, that no man shall have a bowel complaint on the day of battle. Many persons would regret Lord Talavera's illness upon this occasion; but, few, I believe, so sincerely as I should. Sir Vicary Gibbs will suppose, perhaps, that my regret would arise from the loss of my chance of the Portuguese prize for writing the History of Talavera's Wars \*;

\* I find, that I undervalued this prize, when I before spoke of it. I supposed the 50,000 Reals to be worth 150 Guineas; but, by consulting the *UNIVERSAL*

and, I will not disguise, that I should feel that loss, conscious as I am that I shall have a fair claim to the prize; but, what I should feel much more severely, is, the disappointment of my hopes of seeing the grand question decided; namely, whether the Wellesleys or the Buonapartés are best men. I was delighted when I saw them pitted against each other, and I should regret exceedingly any cause that would prevent them from fighting out the battle. — As to the scheme for enabling Lord Talavera to exert the energies of the people of Spain and Portugal, it is neither more nor less a scheme for turning an *auxiliary war* into an *invasion* of the countries which we have been professing to assist. What! is it all come to this at last? We have been told of the zeal of the people, of their hatred of the French, of their attachment to us, of their devotion to the cause, of their being as good troops as any in the world: and now, behold, we are told that their energies want to be called forth; that we ought to assume a more *commanding and decisive tone* with them; that Lord Talavera ought to have greater powers; that factions and treacherous men ought not to be suffered to cramp the operations of the nation; in short, that we ought to take the whole powers of government into our own hands, or, in other words, become invaders and conquerors as far as we are able, of Spain and Portugal; and all this for the sole purpose of giving effect to the *assistance* which we are yielding these countries! — This is, indeed, a most notable scheme; such an one, I will venture to say, as was never before engendered in the brain of any one out of a straight waistcoat. — But, I must defer any further remarks on it until my next.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate,  
Friday, 30th Aug. 1811.

CAMBIST of Dr. KELLY, I find, from page 388, vol. 1, that the Real is not a Portuguese coin, but a Spanish money, and that there are four different kinds, the lowest of which is the *Real Velton*, and which is worth something more than  $2\frac{1}{2}d.$  Sterling. Thus the prize must be, at least, 500 Guineas; and, if *Reals of Plate* are meant, it will double that sum. The proposers should have been more explicit,

## OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRANCE — *M. Regnaud's Address to the Emperor on the subject of the Finances; and his account of the Progress made in the business of the CADASTRE, or valuation of the lands.*—July, 1811.

(Concluded from p. 256.)

..... The good state of your finances, which have been constantly improving during the whole of the war, as is proved by the account I now present to your Majesty, has constantly favoured the execution of these works. It will be seen by these accounts, that the receipts have been seven hundred and seventy-two millions for the year 1808; seven hundred and eighty-six millions for the year 1809; above seven hundred and ninety-five millions for the year 1810; and that they will not fall short of nine hundred and fifty-four millions for the year 1811, by means of the various annexations of territory which have taken place since last year.—The minister then proceeds to state, that this state of things will enable Buonaparté to carry into execution a measure which had been intended ten years ago, but had been always delayed from want of favourable opportunities, that of a general recoinage ordered by a law of 1796; the object of this measure is to do away altogether the fictitious account-money called the *livre tournois*, and to substitute in its stead a coin of the real and fixed value of a franc, of a certain weight and fineness, which is to form the unit of the whole system of coinage. This operation, the Minister observes, will cost the Treasury above five millions for the current year; but on the other hand, he continues, French coin will be in future the best that can be found in any part of the world!—Let the state of France in this respect be compared with that of England, where the Government is reduced to the necessity of receiving of receiving its revenues, and defraying its expenditure, in a paper-money, which loses already 33 per cent.—But how can we establish a comparison between two powers, the one rich in the produce of its own soil, and the other resting solely on commercial profits, increased by the violation of neutral rights, as well as by the ignorance and continued blindness of the Continent?—It is, consequently, easy to foresee the fate which awaits it; and I presume to say to your Majesty, let the

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system adopted since the union of Holland be still maintained for some time, and we shall soon behold the overthrow of that fabric, the foundations of which, already undermined by the baneful influence of a fictitious circulating medium, which alters the nature of all values, and enhances without bounds the price of all necessary articles, rest only on a credit and a commerce, which are in their nature uncertain and transitory.

*Account of the Cadastre.*

The *Cadastre* is a survey by actual admeasurement of every parish, nay of every field, in France, for the purpose of ascertaining the exact proportion of land-tax which each land-owner, or farmer is to pay. The land is afterwards valued by a kind of jury, taken from among the parishioners; and a plan of the parish, with the valuation of each field, is sent to the Minister of Finances. One copy of it is given to the head of the Department, and another remains with the mayor of the parish.—This *Cadastre* is not an invention of the present government of France: the idea originated long before the Revolution, with the ECONOMISTS. A leading tenet of those philosophers was, that agriculture alone was really productive to the State; it followed, of course, that the State was to look exclusively to it for its support; but in their notions of justice, the burthen they thus laid inadvertently on the agriculture they wished to foster, would not be equally supported by all, unless an actual survey and valuation of all the lands should actually take place. So prevalent were those ideas in France at the beginning of the Revolution, that most of the cahiers, or written instructions given to the Deputies of the National Convention by their constituents, contained a recommendation of the *cadastre*.—Buonaparté thus found the idea thoroughly established; and soon discerned the advantages he might derive from it. The *cadastre* will put every acre of land in France as completely at his disposal, as the laws of the conscription mark every man for his soldier. When in want of supplies he will have only to calculate how much an additional *franc* on each acre will produce, and a decree will settle the business. The increase of revenue he will thus acquire will be as sudden as it will be great; for it is well known, that in the parishes already assessed according to the *cadastre*, land has been estimated at the value it

had in 1790, and the tax laid accordingly; whereas the fact is, that in those districts the least injured by the Continental System, the value of land has since that period fallen one-half, and much more in those parts where the produce of the land was chiefly intended for foreign markets.—It appears, that this new system, which will afford such resources to the enemy, is to be put in activity in the year 1813. At that epoch the French system of taxation is, as stated by M. Regnaud, to extend to Holland; it may be concluded, therefore, that the whole empire will be under the same regulations.—The following is M. REGNAUD's account of the progress which has been made in forming the *cadastre*:

Since the beginning of the admeasurement by parcels, which was first adopted in the year 1808, the *cadastre* operation has proceeded in a regular way.—On the 1st of April, 1811, the admeasurement was completed in 5,243 parishes; in the course of the current year it will be likewise completed in 2,000 more parishes; and thus upwards of 7,000 parishes will be admeasured by the 1st of January, 1812. This forms a little more than the seventh part of the territory of France.—The valuation of the land is, of course, more behind hand than the admeasurement, by which it must necessarily be preceded. The number of parishes in which the lands had been valued on the 1st of April, 1811, was 3,145; that measure will take place in 1,700 or 1,800 more, in the course of the present year; and thus, by the 1st of January, 1812, the lands of about 5,000 parishes will have been valued.—One hundred and twenty assemblies at Canton had been held in the beginning of 1811. They had proceeded to examine and to discuss the valuation of lands in the several parishes of their respective districts. The minutes (*proces verbaux*) of those assemblies contain, generally, expressions of satisfaction, and of the most respectful gratitude towards your Majesty, to whose parental care they are thus indebted for the signal advantages which are to result from that measure.—Those 120 cantons include nearly 1,400 parishes, in which the land-tax for 1811 shall be assessed according to their *cadastre*-rolls. This will do away the disproportion in the assessment which formerly existed between different parishes, and between the inhabitants of the same parish. Formerly the proportion of as-

assessment varied between them, from one half of the income to one tenth, one twentieth, and one fiftieth. Uniformity shall thus be introduced in all the assessments.—For these three years the land-tax has been already assessed in 2,400 parishes, according to the cadastre-rolls, formed on valuations made on general surveys, and which have remedied in part those imperfections which the admeasurement by parcels removes more completely; and thus nearly 4,000 cadastre-rolls will be put in activity for the year 1812. The number would have been more considerable, if experience had not proved that it was fit to await the result of the assemblies of Canton to settle the rolls definitively; and this consideration delays the execution of the measure, in a great many parishes which form part of cantons in which there are still some parishes where the admeasurement is not yet completed.—The present state of this undertaking, and the labours which will be completed in the course of 1811, will enable me to propose, next year, to your Majesty, the first application of the ultimate results expected from the cadastre-operation, as affecting the general assessment of the land-tax, to a zone composed of a fraction of each department of the empire. The only thing to be done will be to compare the amount of incomes, as ascertained by the cadastre, in the parishes forming part of the zone, with the total amount of the present assessments of these same parishes; and to establish a proportion between those incomes and the assessments; which proportion must naturally fix the part of his income which each land-owner shall have to set apart for the payment of the land-tax in the year 1813; and that proportion shall be the same for all.—Uniformity in the assessments will be thus partially established, between departments, between parishes, and between land-owners, and as completely for that fraction of the Empire as it will be for the whole when the measure shall have reached its last stage.

#### BANK OF ENGLAND.

*French Remarks, extracted from the Moniteur of the 5th of August, 1811.*

Since none of the reasons derived from the principles of justice, prudence, or humanity, have been able to induce the English Government to depart from its anti-social system,—that system which

gives it as many enemies as there are true citizens in the different States of Europe;—we may be permitted to contemplate, with some interest, the crisis in which that Bank, upon which rest the power and security of the nation, is placed.—When speaking of the affairs of a Bank, we are not involved in those political reveries, amidst which a people already blinded by its passions may be amused and deceived with impunity: here every thing is certain. If the facts alleged be true,—if it be a fact that four pounds sterling in Bank notes are worth only three guineas, (and, unfortunately for the Bank, this is disputed by no one), it must soon submit to acknowledge that its bankruptcy is almost declared. Doubtless, the Ministers and their partisans have good reasons for not all at once avowing their situation; doubtless, they have still some precautions to take, some essential operations to concert, before they give to the situation to which they have conducted affairs, the only name which befits it. This course is natural, and not at all surprising: but that there should be found men of sense and acuteness, who can shut their eyes to the light of evidence, and seek in miserable palliatives for a cure to the evil, is what will hardly be believed six months after the fall of the Bank,—that is, very soon.—Why was not this foreseen, will then say the stupid politicians of Wood-street? It was so clear!—One is almost tempted to laugh at the grave tone with which a Noble Lord, in the House of Commons, endeavoured to shew how much the notes of the English Bank differed from assignats, to which a Member had the indiscretion to compare them. “How can you assimilate late things so unlike?” said he gravely. “Upon the creation of assignats, their issue was enormous; and it frightfully increased in a year or two. With us, on the contrary, even in a period of 15 years, there has scarcely been an increase of 15 millions sterling (360 millions of France) in paper circulation.” It might be answered, that it is by no means the quantity issued, but the power of incessantly issuing, which decides the fall of a paper-money; but it is more proper to observe, that the Noble Lord has blinked the question.—The point for consideration is not what has happened to the Bank of London, but what is now happening to it, and what must naturally ensue. How is it that a paper, issued in so small quantity, has already depreciated? The

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Noble Lord should have thought of this objection, which he himself indiscreetly furnishes, and which it is natural to make to those who attribute the fall of assignats only to their enormous issue. They do not see that they take the effect for the cause; and instead of saying that the great issue was the cause of depreciation, they ought to perceive, from the then existing state of things in France, and from what is now going forward in England, that, in both countries, it was depreciation that led to issue, whether in assignats or bank-paper. The comparison, therefore, was not so misplaced as he wished to persuade the House.—As long as England shared with all Europe the weight of the struggle against a nation divided and torn by parties,—while, enjoying an immense and exclusive commerce, she developed all the sources of prosperity,—is it surprising that she kept at par the paper of her bank, and that she enjoyed a credit which the most insignificant banker obtains as long as his affairs appear in a prosperous state? Certainly not; and it must have lasted till the favouring causes ceased to operate—till the period when France, united as a whole, resumed her superiority upon the Continent. But the point is now for England to cause the effect to continue while the cause has ceased—to re-establish her credit, sinking under the weight of the very force which supported it. Such is the problem which the English Ministers have to solve.—Is there any prospect that they will succeed?—It is a truth become trite, that paper-money exists from the confidence reposed in those who issue it. This confidence is built upon their known resources and their conduct. If it is ascertained that a banking firm gains more than it expends, its paper enjoys a credit, which is in itself an addition to the property of the bankers. If unforeseen accidents or misconduct augment expences and diminish receipts, their credit declines, and can only be restored by a different system of conduct. Such is the state of the Bank of England. Its credit has declined to that degree, that the nominal value of its paper is to its real value as 96 to 75. What has produced this fall? An expenditure always increasing, which must still increase in a frightful progression; and a diminution of its receipts, which soon, from the effects of the Continental system, will be more and more reduced. What cure is proposed for the evil? This is the most curious part of

the subject. Some say that it does not exist; others, that it is of no consequence; a third party, in the hope, doubtless, of resorting to the true remedy, proclaims aloud the danger. What will be the event? One of two things: either the latter will be listened to; or the noise which they have made, and their very zeal, will hasten the evil.—But we do not anticipate events; we wish to present facts, not conjectures: the event belongs to futurity, which we do not presume to penetrate.

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SPAIN.—MONT-SERRAT.—*Official Accounts from the Armies.*—Paris, 14th Aug. 1811.

ARMY OF THE SOUTH.—We read in an intercepted letter, that as soon as Lord Wellington was informed at Albuera of the march of the French army of Portugal, he assembled a Council of War to deliberate upon the part to be taken. The Spanish Generals were present: they warmly opposed the proposition of the English Generals to abandon Spain and repass the Guadiana.—For two months, say they, we have been besieging Badajoz: we have already raised the siege once: the breach is practicable, and in a few days we shall be masters of the place. The possession of Badajoz is important, because it is one of the strongest places in Spain, the key of the Guadiana, and contains all the bridges and besieging equipage of the French army.—The result of the battle we shall fight will be, if we are conquerors, the immediate fall of this important place. Cadiz has been besieged for a year. The French have constructed there a considerable flotilla: they have more than 400 pieces of large calibre in battery: the besieging works they have erected are immense: the result of the battle will be to deliver Cadiz.—The army of Murcia is in motion, and under the walls of Grenada. The result of the battle will permit our junction with that brave army.—The French army of Arragon besieges Tarragona; upon the fate of that place depends that of Catalonia, and the kingdom of Valencia. The result of the battle will be felt undoubtedly even in those provinces.—In fact, victors, we become masters of Extremadura, Andalusia, the kingdom of Cordova, Jaen, Grenada; we take Badajoz, we deliver Cadiz. The French, obliged to repass the Sierra Morena, will be harrassed on all sides, will fear for Madrid, will march the nearest

troops, which are those of Arragon, and thus Tarragona, Catalonia, and Valencia, will be delivered. Never were more important consequences attached to the fate of a battle.—If, on the contrary, we lose it, shall we not be always in time to repass the Guadiana, place ourselves under the protection of Elvas, or the heights of Portalegre? The cavalry of the Army of Portugal not having been yet entirely refitted, the means of conveyance not being yet reorganized, they can undertake nothing before September, and till that time shall we not be always able to defend the Lines of Lisbon, or to maintain ourselves under the cannon of Elvas?—Victors, we shall obtain immense advantages; vanquished, scarcely any inconvenience is attached to our defeat. Our army is as numerous as the French army; they have rather more cavalry than we have, but we have more field artillery. The bad state of the carriages of the Army of Portugal has not permitted them to bring with them more than a small part of their park. The epoch is decisive. Victors! the Peninsula may be delivered; but if, on the contrary, we repass the Guadiana, and evacuate Spain, whether it be in consequence of a battle lost, or a simple deliberation of the present Council of War, the result will be the same; Spain, abandoned for the third time, will be discouraged; Badajoz will be revictualled, the Army of Murcia will be destroyed and dispersed; Tarragona will be taken, Catalonia reduced to submission, Valencia will follow the fate of Tarragona, and the English armies, after having been useless spectators of the defeat of all our armies, will be useless spectators of the capture of all our fortresses, and consequently, of the submission of all our Provinces?—These reasons not having been effectual, the English Generals having resolved to re-pass the Guadiana, the Spaniards separated discontented. On the 30th June they appeared before the fort of Niebla. Colonel Fritzherz, who commanded there, had 300 men. Blake established his batteries on the 31st. On the 1st July he tried an assault. Three successive attacks directed against the two gates were repulsed. The ladders of the Spaniards were thrown down, and 300 remained in the ditches of the place. Among the wounded, the Spaniards include General Zaya.—Upon the first advice which the French Governor of Seville had of the march of Blake, he took the field. On the 5th of

July he took from them three companies at Calanas. On the 5th, the enemy embarked, and the division of Seville picked up a great number of stragglers. Upwards of 2,000 of Blake's band deserted to return home.—On the 6th, Blake and the Spanish Corps sailed for Cadiz.

**ARMY OF ARRAGON.**—All the predictions of the Spanish people are realized. After the capture of Tarragona, Marshal Suchet marched upon Berga, and destroyed that fort: from thence he proceeded upon Mont-Serrat. The insurrectional Junta, intimidated by the capture of Tarragona, had embarked for Majorca, leaving the Marquis D'Ayrolas to defend Mont-Serrat, the general depot and central magazine of the insurgents. Marshal Suchet made dispositions to reconnoitre this place entrenched by art and nature. He arrived at Reuss on the 20th, with the brigade Abbe. On the 22nd, the brigadier Montmarie marched against Ignalada, in front of Frere Harispe. On the 24th the troops were united. The enemy, who had for a moment been alarmed, resumed their security, not thinking we should dare to attack them; but in the night the Marshal marched rapidly upon Bruch, with the brigades Abbe and Montmarie, he found there General Maurice Mathieu with a detachment of the garrison of Barcelona. The attack began upon three redoubts placed at the foot of the mountain, and which covered the entrance of the defile; they were in an instant carried by the bayonet, and occupied by our troops. General Abbe received orders to proceed immediately in front of the defile with the first regiment of infantry, the 144th of the line, and a company of sappers.—The road, long and painful, winds on the flank of a steep mountain: fresh obstacles would have stopped at each step any but French soldiers: intrenchments, redoubts placed on inaccessible rocks, covered the entrance of the convent. Peasants stationed on all tops of the mountains, kept up a terrible fire; the Marquis D'Ayrolas, trusting in the strength of his position, contented himself with ordering that a week's provisions should be carried into the batteries, which he deemed to be impregnable: but General Abbe had already dashed on with two picked companies. These brave men arrived under the rock of the first battery. In spite of the stones and rocks hurled down upon them, they climbed the heights; they are already in the embrasures; the enemy

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lose their confidence; all that could not save themselves were killed in the battery. The cannon were immediately turned against the second battery, against which marched the chief of battalion Ebrand with a picked battalion. He attacked in front, and at once turned the work, which was carried in a few minutes by the bayonet. The Spanish officer was killed on his cannon with the cannoniers.—A third battery, with a strong entrenchment, yet remained in front of the Convent, and presented the greatest obstacles to us to attack in front; but 50 marksmen had climbed, we know not by what audacity, through the clefts of the rocks, and had reached the summit of the peaks of the mountain; from thence they plunged into the very interior of the Convent and the entrenchments. D'Ayrolas immediately descended with part of his men into the ravines and impenetrable paths, where it was impossible to follow him. Some officers were taken with the rest of the soldiers, and the Convent and thirteen hermitages were instantly occupied by our brave men.—We took two standards, ten pieces of cannon, of large calibre, a million of cartridges, an immense quantity of ammunition, cloaths, and provisions.—Deserters from the fort of Figueras have declared, that there are about 1,000 sick in the garrison, which are reduced to half rations.—The English cruisers have disappeared with Campo Verde and his adherents. The merchants of Valencia are carrying off their most precious effects to Alicant and Majorca.

## DISTRICT OF THE ARMY OF THE NORTH.

—The assemblage of the Gallicians, commanded by Santocildes, has tried a fresh attack upon the posts of Orbigo. On the 2nd July, at two in the morning, Santocildes at the head of all his troops appeared at the village of Vellamor, upon Orbigo. Gen. Bonnet had time to collect three regiments at Villa d'Angas: he marched immediately against the enemy, who, after some moment's firing, were staggered by a fine charge of the 12th dragoons, which determined them to retreat, leaving many dead upon the field of battle.—A reconnoissance pushed on the 10th towards Astorga, announced that the enemy seemed willing to maintain themselves there, and were reinforcing themselves with peasants.—On the 14th General Bonnet, with a strong detachment, reconnoitred the position of the enemy, who hastened his retreat over the mountains of Villa Franca,

without its being possible to bring him to an action, which would have decided his fate.

## DISTRICT OF THE ARMY OF THE CENTRE.

—The town of Cuenca, cleared of the brigands, has been occupied in a military manner, and the province occupied like those of the interior: the greater part of the prisoners desired to enter into our service: those that were dispersed, return successively to their homes: all the Commons are loud against the frightful system of these bands, which know neither friend nor foe; they all desired arms and the honour of defending themselves: several have already distinguished themselves by the arrest of some leaders too famous for their atrocities.

SWEDEN.—*Edict for the repressing of Luxury.—July 10th, 1811.*

Sir,—The King has felt himself obliged, in order to destroy that tendency to luxury and effeminacy which has already, perhaps, taken root in the nation, not only to invite his faithful subjects to renounce such pernicious abuses, but also to renew the ancient ordinances with regard to smuggling, which shall in future be severely punished. Under these circumstances, I think it my duty to invite you to exert yourself with zeal in this important business.—The experience of past times, and the renewal of the ancient ordinances, sufficiently show the inefficacy of laws in attaining the object proposed. When nations the most respectable prefer an empty brilliancy to that which is real, frivolity to gravity, and the thirst of gain to an honest competence, they are led astray; the superfluities of foreign countries injure the native productions of their own, and every one sacrifices the public good to his personal interest. It is in vain that the law opposes its authority to the progress of the evil, while punishment, slowly reaching two or three individuals, gives time for inventing new subterfuges.—But there is a powerful mean of supporting the law, of rousing the national spirit, and of re-establishing order,—it is the example of submission to authority, of respect for the ordinances connected with decency, morals, and sobriety, which should be given by the first societies of the kingdom, by holding up the dissipated and the selfish to contempt, and by honouring those who practise temperance, and know how to impose upon themselves privations. It

becomes me especially, in the high rank which I hold from the confidence of the King and the nation, to set the first example; and it will not cost me any sacrifice to do so. From the moment when my fate was united with that of Sweden, I have not felt the least foreign want; I have had no wants but those of my new country. Desolated by war and internal troubles, hardly escaped from dangers which appeared to threaten its speedy ruin, when its preservation and security require the slight sacrifice of some imaginary wants of luxury, I cannot believe that the thinking part of the nation, who know our external relations, and our situation at home, who call to mind the honour and the virtues of their ancestors, will forget for a moment their dignity and their duties; but, listening to these two noble motives, will enforce the wise views of the King.—It is to you, Sir, as well as to the other authorities of the kingdom, that the honour will belong of realising as much as possible, by your distinguished example, the intentions of his Majesty; and I expect with entire confidence this new proof of your fidelity to your King, and of your devotedness to your country, assuring you that I shall mark it with peculiar complacency.—I therefore recommend you to Almighty God, and am your affectionate

CHARLES JOHN.

*Castle of Drottningholm,  
July 10, 1811.*

SWEDEN.—*Edict relative to Commerce.*—  
July 26, 1811.

We, Charles, by the Grace of God, King of Sweden, of the Goths and Vandals, &c. hereby make known, that where-as the term for the commercial relations between Sweden and Finland, stipulated by the 17th Article of the Treaty concluded between us and the Emperor of Russia at Frederickshaven, on the 17th of September, 1809, expires on the 13th of October next, we have thought proper, with the concurrence of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, to prolong the same for one year, from the above date, in witness whereof we have set our hand and

seal, during the illness of my most gracious Sovereign and Lord, and by his command,

CHARLES JOHN.

PRUSSIA.—*Edict relative to Commerce.*—  
July 21, 1811.

We, Frederick William, by the Grace of God, King of Prussia, &c. desiring invariably to conform to all the measures adopted by his Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, relative to the Maritime Commerce, and the Continental System, we have decreed, in accord with his said Majesty, as follows: We renew, in the most rigorous manner, the former prohibitions against the importation of colonial products of every description, under pain of irremissible confiscation; henceforth there will be no more certificates granted for exportation which state the payment of the duties established by the Continental tariff.—On the other hand we have established the principle of not shackling the exportation by sea of continental products, destined for neutral or allied countries, and not to subject to an augmentation of duties those continental products which are considered of the first necessity, in virtue of which we command, reckoning from this day, the exportation of all kinds of grain and wood for building, destined from any port in our States to a neutral or allied country. It shall be considered free and lawful, upon paying, nevertheless, an extraordinary duty of 32 thalers 12 gros on each last of either of the said merchandizes. We consequently order our commercial agents in our different sea-ports, to throw no obstacle in the way of exporting the productions of the country, and those of the Continent in general, observing at the same time, that they are not to deliver the certificates required for corn and building-wood, intended for exportation, previous to the above-mentioned duties being paid.—Besides, the same Commissioners will act with the utmost vigilance to support the continental system, which will continue in full and entire vigour. (Signed)

FREDERICK WILLIAM.